☀ Key Stats
◆ About two-thirds of emerging market and developing economies depend heavily on commodity exports such as energy, metals and agricultural products.
◆ Roughly 90% of low-income economies are classified as commodity exporters, compared with only about 13% of advanced economies.
◆ Among emerging and developing economies, about 25% are agricultural commodity exporters, 23% are energy exporters and 16% are metal exporters.
◆ Resource revenues have accounted for an average 53% of government revenue in energy exporters since 2000, compared with 14% in metal exporters and 11% in agricultural exporters.
◆ Fiscal policy in commodity-exporting developing economies was about twice as procyclical as in commodity importers over 2007–2024.
◆ Procyclical fiscal policy increased the output impact of commodity-price shocks by about 21% in the average developing commodity exporter.
◆ For the same commodity-price shock, the estimated output response in developing commodity exporters was more than three times larger than in advanced-economy exporters because their fiscal responses moved in opposite directions.
◆ Real primary government spending was about 40% more volatile in commodity-exporting developing economies than in commodity importers over 1990–2024.
◆ Median government debt among commodity exporters reached 51% of GDP in 2025, nearly double its 2010 level.
◆ Among commodity-exporting countries covered by the World Bank-IMF debt sustainability framework, the share assessed as being at low risk fell from about 22% in 2015 to 10% in 2025.
◆ By the end of 2024, 50 of 94 commodity-exporting developing economies had at least one fiscal rule, up from 15 in 2000.
◆ The number of operational sovereign wealth funds in commodity-exporting developing economies tripled from 16 in 2000 to 48 in 2024.
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About two-thirds of emerging market and developing economies depend heavily on commodity exports, according to a new World Bank report.
The dependence is even greater among the world’s poorest economies, with roughly 90% of low-income countriesrelying heavily on exports of agricultural products, metals or energy.
That leaves a large part of the developing world exposed to abrupt changes in global commodity prices.
When prices rise, export earnings and government revenues can surge. When they fall, governments may suddenly have less money available for public services, infrastructure and other spending.
The World Bank’s Fiscal Policy in Commodity Exporters: A Balancing Act examines how governments have handled those swings and how fiscal policy can either cushion or amplify their economic effects.
Commodity dependence varies sharply by type of exporter
Commodity dependence is not distributed evenly across developing economies.
About 25% of emerging market and developing economies are classified as agricultural commodity exporters, while 23% are energy exporters and 16% are metal exporters.
Advanced economies are much less likely to depend heavily on commodity exports.
Only about 13% of advanced economies meet the World Bank’s commodity-exporter definition, compared with roughly two-thirds of emerging and developing economies.
Government budgets can be particularly exposed in countries that export energy.
Resource revenues have accounted for an average 53% of total fiscal revenue in energy exporters since 2000.
The comparable shares were about 14% for metal exporters and 11% for agricultural exporters.
Oil exporters are also highly concentrated on the trade side.
Oil makes up about half of total goods exports in the average oil-exporting economy covered by the report, while copper represents about 28% of exports in the median copper exporter.
Government spending often moves with commodity prices
The World Bank finds that fiscal policy remains more procyclical in commodity exporters than in other developing economies.
Procyclical fiscal policy means government spending tends to rise alongside economic activity and commodity revenues during booms, then weaken during downturns.
That can turn an external commodity-price movement into a larger domestic economic swing.
Over 2007–2024, fiscal policy in commodity-exporting developing economies was about twice as procyclical as in commodity importers, according to the report.
The World Bank also estimates how much this behavior can amplify a commodity-price shock.
In its model, a shock that directly increases output by 1 percentage point is followed by an additional 0.21-percentage-point increase because of the fiscal response in the average developing commodity exporter.
That raises the total estimated GDP response to 1.21 percentage points.
Advanced commodity exporters showed the opposite pattern.
Their fiscal response reduced the effect of the same direct 1-percentage-point output shock by about 0.65 percentage point, leaving a net increase of only 0.35 percentage point.
The result means the estimated output response to an identical commodity shock was more than three times larger in developing exporters because fiscal policy amplified the movement rather than cushioning it.
During the 2003–2008 commodity boom, the World Bank estimates that differences in fiscal behavior explained more than three-quarters of the growth gap between the developing and advanced commodity exporters in its sample.
Fiscal policy is also more volatile
Commodity exporters face a second problem: government finances themselves tend to fluctuate more.
Over 1990–2024, real primary government spending was about 40% more volatile in commodity-exporting developing economies than in other developing economies.
The report finds similar patterns for government revenue, consumption and primary budget balances.
Countries with larger commodity sectors generally experienced greater fiscal volatility even after differences in income levels were taken into account.
The World Bank says this matters because unpredictable government spending and taxes can add uncertainty for households and businesses and disrupt investment.
In a counterfactual exercise, the report estimates that if the average developing commodity exporter had policies closer to those of advanced economies in exchange-rate flexibility, capital-account openness and fiscal rules, fiscal volatility could have fallen from 11.4% to 8.8%.
The model suggests that could have raised average annual GDP per capita growth from about 1.6% to 1.8%, a gain of approximately 0.2 percentage point per year.
That is a model-based counterfactual rather than a forecast of what any individual country would achieve.
Government debt nearly doubled from 2010
Commodity exporters entered the 2000s with relatively high debt but reduced it substantially during the commodity boom.
Median government debt fell from about 56% of GDP in 2000 to 25% in 2008, helped by stronger revenues, economic growth, debt relief and improved fiscal management.
Much of that progress was later reversed.
Commodity prices weakened during the 2010s, including the major oil-price decline of 2014–2016, while the COVID-19 pandemic and subsequent economic shocks placed additional pressure on government budgets.
By 2025, median government debt among developing commodity exporters had reached 51% of GDP, nearly twice its 2010 level.
Debt vulnerabilities also became more widespread among the lower-income commodity exporters assessed under the joint World Bank-IMF debt sustainability framework.
The share classified as being at low risk of debt distress fell from about 22% in 2015 to 10% in 2025.
More countries have adopted fiscal rules and savings funds
Governments have increasingly introduced fiscal rules designed to prevent temporary commodity windfalls from producing permanently higher spending.
The number of commodity-exporting developing economies with at least one fiscal rule increased from 15 in 2000 to 50 in 2024.
By the end of 2024, 50 of 94 commodity exporters covered by the analysis had at least one such rule, with 112 individual fiscal rules in force across those countries.
Budget-balance and debt rules were the most common.
But the World Bank cautions that simply adopting a rule does not guarantee more stable public finances.
Evidence on their effectiveness is mixed, and the report says fiscal rules work better when they have credible enforcement, transparent budgets, strong legal foundations and institutions capable of resisting pressure to spend commodity windfalls.
Sovereign wealth funds have also become much more common.
The number of operational funds in commodity-exporting developing economies tripled from 16 in 2000 to 48 in 2024.
More than half of developing commodity exporters now have a sovereign wealth fund, and the share reached 83% among energy exporters in 2024.
Such funds can save part of a commodity windfall during strong markets and provide financial resources when revenues fall.
But their effectiveness also depends on governance, transparency and how closely the fund is integrated with the government’s broader budget framework.
The energy transition creates different risks for oil and metal exporters
Commodity dependence is also changing as the global energy system shifts.
Oil and other fossil-fuel exporters could face declining government revenues over the longer term if global demand falls.
Metal exporters face a different possibility.
Growing demand for minerals used in electrification, renewable energy and other technologies could increase export and fiscal revenues, but higher prices could create another cycle of windfalls and spending pressures.
The report estimates that a 1% increase in a country-specific metal price index is associated with a cumulative 0.58% increase in real fiscal revenue after 10 quarters in the median metal exporter.
Government expenditure shows little median response, although results vary substantially across countries.
The World Bank argues that both groups therefore face versions of the same underlying challenge: converting volatile resource income into more stable sources of long-term growth.
✦ Why it matters ✦
Commodity dependence affects far more than export earnings.
For governments that receive a large share of revenue from oil, minerals or agricultural commodities, global price movements can determine how much money is available for infrastructure, education, health care and other public spending.
That exposure is especially important because 90% of low-income economies depend heavily on commodities and may have fewer alternative sources of government revenue.
The report shows that the economic impact depends partly on how governments respond.
Commodity-price volatility itself originates outside most exporting countries, but procyclical spending can make its domestic effects larger by increasing expenditure in booms and cutting it when revenues weaken.
The World Bank’s 21% amplification estimate illustrates that distinction.
The same external commodity shock can produce very different economic outcomes depending on whether fiscal policy reinforces or cushions it.
The longer-term stakes extend to employment and investment.
About 1.2 billion young people are expected to reach working age across emerging and developing economies between 2025 and 2035, with commodity-exporting economies home to nearly half of that group.
StatsJournalist has previously covered the World Bank’s estimate that 1.2 billion young people will reach working age by 2035.
Fiscal stability does not by itself create those jobs, but volatile budgets can make sustained public investment and economic planning more difficult.
The energy transition adds another layer of uncertainty.
Oil-dependent governments may eventually have to replace declining resource revenues, while metal exporters could face the opposite problem: managing potentially larger windfalls without repeating earlier boom-and-bust spending patterns.
ⓘ How to read the findings
The World Bank uses “emerging market and developing economies,” or EMDEs, as its main country grouping.
The headline “developing economies” is a shorter description of that group, but the report’s exact category is EMDEs.
An economy is classified as a commodity exporter if commodities accounted for at least 30% of total exports on average during 2017–2019, or if any single commodity accounted for at least 20% of total exports.
Economies that reached those thresholds only because of re-exports are excluded.
The report’s 2026 commodity classification covers 154 emerging market and developing economies, including 24 low-income countries, as well as 38 advanced economies.
Fiscal procyclicality is measured primarily by examining how real government spending moves with real GDP.
A positive relationship means spending tends to increase during economic expansions and decrease during downturns, while a negative relationship indicates more countercyclical policy.
The broad fiscal-procyclicality analysis uses annual data covering 1980–2024.
The specific estimate showing fiscal policy adding 0.21 percentage point to the effect of a commodity-price shock is based on 11 developing commodity exporters and four advanced-economy exporters.
It should therefore not be interpreted as an identical effect for every commodity-exporting country.
The fiscal-volatility calculations cover annual data for 146 emerging and developing economies over 1990–2024 and use several measures, including primary spending, government consumption, revenue and the primary balance.
The 51% of GDP debt figure is a median rather than an average and is based on data for up to 92 commodity-exporting developing economies.
The growth estimate of an additional 0.2 percentage point per year is a counterfactual exercise.
It estimates what might have happened under a different set of fiscal and macroeconomic policies rather than predicting future growth.
The supplied World Bank document is an advance edition of Fiscal Policy in Commodity Exporters: A Balancing Act.
Its data cutoff was July 24, 2026, and individual indicators in the report use different country samples and time periods.
